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• NASA’s position and exposure
• Cyber is “nothing new”
• Space viewed from a Cyber perspective
• The scope of NASA’s challenge
• Systemic solutions
NASA as a symbol of National Excellence
• Prestige - NASA is seen by the world as a symbol of US 
economic, scientific and technical excellence and superiority.
• Ideals - NASA’s missions, facilities and vehicles are visual 
representations of many of the United States’ ideals and unique 
place as a champion of freedom and opportunity in the world.
• Economic Power – NASA’s engineering and technology (along 
with NASA’s commercial and academic partners) represent the 
produce of some of the best and brightest minds in the world –
who have been working with significant national resources to 
back their research.
• NASA’s accomplishments also draw negative attention
– Terrorism – Attack in the most visible, publicly disturbing 
way possible.
– Espionage – US technology is sought after by the rest of 
the world.  US aerospace, computing and cutting-edge 
engineering is a vital resource that others want to capture 
and exploit.
– Suspicion – Many nations (and non-state actors) view all 
US Government organizations as part of the US military or 
US intelligence community.  This can lead them to see 
NASA as an extension of the military.










• System (Technology, Engineering, Test)
• Operations (Launch, Flight, Recovery)
• Logistics (Re-Use, Sparing, etc.)
• 1st flight in 1981
Buran
• Nearly identical, re-usable space system
• “Developed” by the Soviet Union 
• 1st (and only) flight in 1988
PATRIOTIC
MISSION PATCHES
Chance?  No, Cyber.
“When U.S. space shuttles started linking up with 
Russia's Mir space station in 1995, both sides owed a 
small debt to the old Soviet secret police, the KGB. 
According to documents obtained by NBC News, it 
was the KGB that successfully stole the U.S. shuttle 
design in the '70s and '80s.”
The key in terms of the shuttle program was “overt 
collection” and specifically the use of commercial 
databases. In effect, the massive effort directed at the 
U.S. space shuttle program was among the first cases 
of Internet espionage, if not the first case. With all the 
critical documents online, it was left to the VPK, under 
the auspices of the KGB, to gather it all up and then 
circulate it to those in the space program who needed it.”









The NASA Cyber Environment: Operations
• Today’s space operations involves interconnection of multiple 
facilities, control centers, engineering organizations and science 
centers to accomplish the mission.
– Many connections in and out of critical systems
– Many organizations and individuals (students, foreign partners, 
commercial entities, other government agencies, etc.)
• Control infrastructure is (only) highly specialized applications and 
databases running on top of IT infrastructure.
• The challenge to cyber security in operations: NASA must do two 
(often opposed) things well:
1. Secure and protect the critical mission control / mission 
support infrastructure and systems to ensure safe, 
successful mission operations, protection of sensitive data, 
and assured space flight capability.
2. Open up the critical mission control / mission support 
infrastructure to partners, collaborators and the “public” to 
perform the science and outreach missions with which the 
Agency is chartered.
What HAS Changed?
The NASA Cyber Environment: Communications
• “Classic” space communications systems and 
architectures were very independent and stove-
piped. 
• Today’s architectures are
– Increasingly interconnected (multiple control 
centers, flight systems, ground stations)
– Increasingly interoperable and shared 
(international partnerships)
– Relying on modern network techniques and 
technologies to enable advanced mission 
concepts (eg. Mars Network)
Massive improvements have also changed how we need 
to look at space communications in terms of assurance 
of communications:
• Confidentiality of the information
• Integrity of the information
• Availability of the capability to communicate
Need to consider the effects of interconnectedness 
and the vulnerabilities that networked systems 
create.
What HAS Changed?
The NASA Cyber Environment: Research / Engineering
• NASA’s research and engineering 
represents some of the greatest investment 
made by the US in cutting edge technology.
• NASA research is conducted at
– NASA Centers
– Universities
– NASA Contractor partners
– NASA’s international partners
• While NASA’s data is not classified, it often 
contains highly sensitive and proprietary 
information that would certainly benefit 
companies and countries with less 
advanced technology, science and 
engineering ability.
• NASA’s research and engineering
– Databases and information 
repositories
– Advanced modeling and simulation 
capabilities


































The Threat to NASA (and US Aerospace) Today
• NASA’s architectures are now incredibly intertwined and 
networked.  It is no longer possible to accomplish 
NASA’s mission using standalone communications 
and command / control architectures.
• Nation States take advantage of this
– Motivated by national objectives
– Economic / Military Advantage
– Political / Diplomatic calculations
– Cyber-espionage is a main aim
• Cyber-Terrorists take advantage of this
– Politically motivated
– Seek high degree of visibility
– Aim is severe disruption
• Hacktivists take advantage of this
– Motivated by “social consciousness”
– Generally non-destructive
• Old School Hackers take advantage of this
– Building “cred”
– Hacking to test skills / for the challenge















































1. Understand the Environment
2. Collaboration & Communities
3. Ensure rigorous processes and 
methods to produce information for 
decision makers.
4. Ensure common standards / training 
and language across practitioners.
Organizational Challenges to Addressing Cyber
NASA’s culture
• “Failure is not an option.”
• “We are an open, science organization…”
• “The world loves us!”
• “Mission” is separate from “Institutional”
NASA’s mainstream experience base
• Limited expertise in advanced networks (from an IT perspective)
• Very limited experience in malicious threat and harm mitigation
• An “IT centric” approach to Cyber fails to work in NASA’s domain
– It is not enough to “follow the FIPS or SANS playbooks”.  They 
simply don’t marry well to the one-off space systems 
environment
• NASA’s expertise is in systems engineering and mission operations 
which takes work to translate to Information Assurance
NASA’s management approach
• Program management knobs: Cost, Schedule, Performance
• Security (Information Assurance, Counter-space) are “black arts”
– A “security expert” participates in reviews and levies additional, 
unfunded requirements without explaining why

































◄ “None of us is as 







◄ Provide insight to 
decision makers.
◄ Provide methods and 
techniques to quantify.
◄ Leverage NASA system 
engineering discipline 
excellence to new 
domain.
◄ Provide rigor to ensure 
thorough identification, 
analysis and assessment.
◄ Leverage “best of breed”
techniques for 










1. What systems and elements are needed for the mission?
2. What capabilities must be available / provided AND WHEN?
3. How can a failure happen (or be caused to happen?)
• What would an adversary WANT to have happen?
• What is the likelihood they would try?






















































Similar to process in 
NPR 8705.5A, ICD503 
and other USG policies 
and to traditional PRA 
approaches. 
Analysis of fault trees and 
fault branches, quantification 
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